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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43632 
      ) 
v.      ) KOOTENAI COUNTY  
      ) NO. CR 2014-1461 
      ) 
ZACHERY SCOTT SHIPMAN,  ) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
      )  
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In his opening brief, Mr. Shipman argued the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over him because, by relying on his so-called grooming 
behavior and the lack of change in his static risk factors, the district court did not reach 
its decision based on an exercise of reason.  In response, the State argued the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman “in 
light of the egregiousness of the offense, [Mr.] Shipman’s poor conduct and minimal 
effort in the rider program, and the risk he presents to the community.”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  
Had the district court relied on the factors identified by the State, it could arguably have 
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relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman as a proper exercise of its discretion.  But the 
district court did not rely on these factors.  Instead, the district court relied on 
Mr. Shipman’s “grooming behavior,” the lack of change in his static risk factors, and his 
poor journaling.  These factors cannot support imposition of a sentence of incarceration 
under Idaho Code § 19-2521 and thus reflect that the district court abused its discretion.  
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Mr. Shipman set forth a complete statement of facts and course of proceedings 
in his opening brief.  He includes this section here only to point out that the State did not 
object to the statement in his opening brief that the second Addendum to the 
Presentence Investigation Report (“APSI”) contains an error concerning his static risk 
factors, which should have resulted in him being assessed as a moderate risk, rather 
than a high risk, to reoffend.  (See App. Br., p.7.)  The first APSI includes a handwritten 
notation on the Sex Offender Risk Assessment which states that the factor, “Ever 
Cohabitated with an Intimate Partner for more than 2 years” should not have been 
checked, and the same box is checked—mistakenly—on the Sex Offender Risk 
Assessment included with the second APSI.  (See App. Br., p.,7, n.2.)    
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 







The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Shipman And Executed His Sentence 
 
The district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Shipman and executed his sentence because it did not reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason.  See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013) (stating “[a] court 
properly exercises its discretion” when, among other things, it “reaches its decision by 
an exercise of reason”).  Idaho Code § 19-25212 lists the factors a court should 
consider in determining whether to place a defendant on probation or impose a term of 
imprisonment.  See State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915-16 (Ct. App. 2005).  The statute 
provides that a court may impose a term of imprisonment instead of probation if it 
determines: 
(a)  There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence 
 or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
 
(b)  The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be 
 provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
 
(c)  A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 
 defendant's crime; or 
 
(d)  Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to 
 the defendant; or 
 
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other 
 persons in the community; or 
 
(f)  The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal. 
 
I.C. § 19-2521(1).  Here, the district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman 
because:  (1) Mr. Shipman displayed “grooming behavior” on his rider; (2) his static risk 
factors did not change over the course of his rider; and (3) he “did a poor job of 
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journaling daily.”  (9/24/15 Tr., p.51, L.23 – p.53, L.3.)  These factors do not correlate 
with those set forth in § 19-2521 and, on the contrary, appear to reflect a mistaken 
understanding of Mr. Shipman’s risk of committing another crime.  By relying on these 
factors, the district court abused its discretion. 
Let us first consider Mr. Shipman’s “grooming behavior.”  The State now appears 
to recognize that Mr. Shipman did not display grooming behavior on his rider.  
(Resp. Br., p.6.)  The State asserts, however, that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in considering Mr. Shipman’s “lack of impulse control” and “ongoing violations 
of the [rider] rules.”  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  The district court did abuse its discretion because 
Mr. Shipman did not ultimately display a lack of impulse control and commit ongoing 
violations of rider rules.  The second APSI recommended that Mr. Shipman be placed 
on probation because he “demonstrated an ideal level of assertiveness and boundary 
setting in the later part of his program” and “an ideal ability to be amenable to treatment 
and supervision in the community.”  (Conf. Exs., p.82.)  Had Mr. Shipman displayed 
grooming behavior—true grooming behavior—that certainly would have been relevant 
to the question of whether he might commit another crime.  But the fact that 
Mr. Shipman displayed interest—even, arguably, sexual interest—in other adult male 
offenders on his rider is not relevant to the question of whether he might commit another 
crime.  (See PSI, p.73.)   
Let us next consider the lack of change in Mr. Shipman’s static risk factors over 
the course of his rider.  Counsel for Mr. Shipman correctly pointed out to the district 
court that static risk factors do not generally change.   Counsel for Mr. Shipman said, “I 
just want to ensure the Court understands that the static risk factors would not change 
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once on the retained [jurisdiction] because they’re immutable characteristics . . . and we 
would not see an improved score.”  (9/25/15 Tr., p.51, L.24 to p.52, L.6.)  The district 
court responded as follows: 
I understand that, but we’re still at an assessed moderate to high level 
with conduct occurring in a controlled setting, the grooming behavior . . . .  
I understand your point, but that moderate to high level of risk is 
corroborated by his engaging in further conduct in a sexual nature in a 
prison setting, and . . . I don’t see that fact changing that there won’t be a 
high likelihood of future victims, and I think it corroborates the moderate to 
high level that we’ve seen in this case if that makes sense.  
 
(9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-20.)  The district court’s language, quoted above, reflects that it 
was concerned about Mr. Shipman’s sexual conduct toward other offenders on his rider, 
and believed that this conduct suggested a high likelihood of future victims—
presumably like the five-year-old victim in this case.  The district court’s concern about 
Mr. Shipman’s potential risk of reoffending based on the lack of change in his static risk 
factors is not a result of an exercise of reason.   
 The only factor that the district court reasonably considered was Mr. Shipman’s 
poor journaling.  And it is not clear how the fact that Mr. Shipman completed only about 
thirty percent of his journal assignments bears on any of the factors set forth in Idaho 
Code § 19-2521.  (See 9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.23-25.)  This was Mr. Shipman’s first 
criminal offense.  (Conf. Exs., p.8.)  He had no criminal history and passed a polygraph 
examination, in which he stated that there were no other victims.  (Conf. Exs., pp.8, 42-
43, 55.)  The psychosexual evaluation concluded that Mr. Shipman was both amenable 
to, and interested in pursuing, sex offender treatment.  (Conf. Exs., p.34.)  And the 
second APSI recommended that Mr. Shipman be placed on probation.   
 6 
 The district court had discretion to place (or not to place) Mr. Shipman on 
probation.  But it abused its discretion in making this decision based largely on 
Mr. Shipman’s so-called grooming behavior and the lack of change in his static risk 
factors.  The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Shipman and 





Mr. Shipman respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction over him and remand this case to the district court with 
instructions to place him on probation.   
 DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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